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Finite-model theory is a study of the logical properties of finite mathematical structures. This paper 
is a very personalized view of finite-model theory, where the author focuses on his own personal 
history, and results and problems of interest to him, especially those springing from work in his 
Ph.D. thesis. Among the topics discussed are: 
(1) D#&mces herween the model theory of‘jinire structures and infinite structures. Most of the 
classical theorems of logic fail for finite structures, which gives us a challenge to develop new 
concepts and tools, appropriate for finite structures. 
(2) The rehtionship between ,finite-model theory and complexity rheorp. Surprisingly enough, it 
turns out that, in some cases, we can characterize complexity classes (such as NP) in terms of logic, 
where there is no notion of machine, computation, or time. 
(3) O-l lags. There is a remarkable phenomenon which says that certain properties (such as those 
expressible in first-order logic) are either almost surely true or almost surely false. 
(4) Descriptice complexity theory. Here we consider how complex a formula must be to express 
a given property. 
In recent years, there has been a re-awakening of interest in finite-mode1 theory. One goal of this 
paper is to help “fan the flames” of interest, by introducing more researchers to this fascinating area. 
1. Introduction 
Model theory is a study of the logical properties of mathematical structures. Model 
theory is a key area of mathematical logic, and has a rich body of results (see, for 
example, [14] or [87]). 
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An important part of mathematics (as opposed to mathematical logic) is the study 
of finite structures, such as finite graphs or finite groups. However, the model theory 
of finite structures is, in my opinion, quite underdeveloped compared to unrestricted 
model theory. Why is this? There are (at least) two reasons: philosophical and 
technical. The philosophical reason is that logic was developed.to provide a solid 
foundation for mathematics, which includes the study of all structures, both finite 
and infinite. There is no particular reason to restrict our attention to finite struc- 
tures. In fact, as observed by Gurevich [52], if anything it is the inJinite structures 
that need the most attention, since problems seem most likely to arise there! The 
second reason is technical: almost none of the key theorems and tools of model 
theory, such as the completeness theorem and the compactness theorem, apply to 
finite structures. This issue is discussed in Section 3. Among the few tools of model 
theory that still work on finite structures are the games of Ehrenfeucht [25] and 
Frai’sst [39] (for an introduction to EhrenfeuchttFrai’ssC games and some of their 
applications to finite-model theory, see [3, pp. 12221261). Chang and Keisler note 
that “in almost all of the deeper theorems in model theory the key to the proof is to 
construct the right kind of model” [14, p. 2). These models almost invariably turn 
out to be injinite structures. 
The main challenge of finite-model theory is to develop new concepts and asso- 
ciated tools, including concepts and tools which may be meaningful only for finite 
structures. One example (discussed in Section 5) is the relationship to complexity 
classes. Another example (discussed in Section 6) is the idea of considering the 
asymptotic probabilities of sentences as the cardinality of the universe grows. 
My 1973 Ph.D. thesis [30] (which was later published as the papers [31L353) dealt 
exclusively with finite-model theory. I was disappointed that the field languished for 
years afterwards: very few papers were published in the area in the next ten years or so. 
However, in the mid-1970s Hajek [55, 561 discussed the importance of finite model 
theory. In fact, in [56], Hajek made the explicit proposal to “develop logic (classical 
and generalized) modified by allowing only finite models”. In recent years, there has 
been a re-awakening of interest in finite-model theory. There are several possible 
reasons for this renewed interest. One reason is the connection with complexity theory 
(see Section 5). 
Another reason is the connection with databases and logic programming. In fact, it 
is possible to think of a database as simply a finite structure. This has not stopped 
many researchers, including me, from considering infinite databases when it is thereby 
possible to obtain interesting results. For example, in one key construction in [36] 
I take the direct product of an infinite family of relations, each of which has at least 
two tuples; so, the result is not only infinite but even uncountable. I shudder to think 
of a database practitioner’s reaction to an uncountable database! Another example is 
in a paper of Vardi [99], where Beth’s theorem (which fails for finite structures) is 
invoked. In the early days of database theory, I pushed database theory in the 
direction of model theory. In contrast, others, such as Ullman, were pushing the field 
towards algorithmic questions. Each of these directions has remained important for 
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database theory. I will not discuss database theory in this paper. The interested reader 
is referred to textbooks by Ullman [96] and Maier [Sl], and survey papers by 
Kanellakis [67], Chandra [12], and by Vardi and myself [38]. 
Perhaps the actual reason for the current interest in finite model theory is that 
critical mass is starting to be achieved. I hope that this paper can help add to the 
critical mass. 
Definitions are given in Section 2. Some differences between the model theory of 
finite structures and infinite structures are discussed in Section 3. Spectra and 
generalized spectra are defined in Section 4. The relationship between (generalized) 
spectra and complexity theory is explored in Section 5. In Section 6, there is a dis- 
cussion of O-1 laws. Descriptive complexity issues appear in Section 7. Section 
8 contains the conclusions, including a classification by Vardi of finite-model theory 
into three lines of research. 
2. Definitions and conventions 
The definitions in this section are informal and incomplete. For a careful develop- 
ment, see any good logic textbook, such as [26] or [89]. 
A language ?Z (sometimes called a similurity type, a signature, or a oocabulary) 
is a finite set {Pi, . . ..P.} or relation symbols, each of which has an arity. Constant 
or function symbols are not allowed; this is unimportant except in the case of O-l 
laws in Section 6, where the effect of allowing constant or function symbols is 
mentioned. 
An _Y-structure (or structure ouer 9, or simply structure) is a set A (called the 
universe), along with a mapping associating a relation Ri over A with each PiE2’2 
where Ri has the same arity as Pi, for 1 <i <s. We may call Ri the interpretation ofPi. 
The structure is calledjifinite if A is. For convenience, the universe of a finite structure 
will always be taken to be {0, 1, . . . . n- 1) for some natural number n. 
For definitions of a first-order sentence (where, intuitively, the only quantification is 
over members of the universe, and not over, say, sets of members of the universe) and 
what it means for a structure d to satisfy a sentence 0, written .d + 0, see [26] or 
[89]. If d satisfies 0, then d is a model of (T (and a jinite model if Caz is a finite 
structure). A sentence is satisfiable (jnitely sutisjiuble) if it has a model (finite model). 
It is valid (valid ouer$nite structures) if it is satisfied by every structure (finite structure) 
over the language of (T. We note that throughout this paper, we allow equality as 
a special predicate symbol, which is not considered to be a member of the language dp, 
and which always has the standard interpretation. 
Let C be a set of sentences, and let c be a single sentence. Then C logically implies CT, 
written C + c, if every structure that satisfies (every sentence of) C also satisfies c. 
Equivalently, C logically implies c if there is no “counterexample structure” that 
satisfies C but not o. 
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3. Some differences in the finite case 
As noted earlier, many classical theorems of model theory fail for finite structures 
(see [Sl, 531). In this section, some of the differences between finite-model theory and 
(unrestricted) model theory are considered. 
One of the great early contributions to mathematical logic is Godel’s completeness 
theorem. Giidel considers a particular proof system for first-order sentences, and 
writes C t- 0 if there is a proof of 0 from 1 in this proof system. He then proves the 
following theorem. 
Theorem 3.1 (Completeness theorem). C + g ifl C t r~. 
One reason why this result is remarkable is that it shows that a universal search 
over all possible structures .d (checking to see whether every structure L& that satisfies 
Z also satisfies c) is equivalent to the existence of a finite object (a proof of o from C). 
Because we can systematically list all proofs, we obtain the following important 
consequence of the completeness theorem. 
Corollary 3.2. The set of valid first-order sentences is r.e. (recursively enumerable). 
However, the next theorem says that we cannot replace “r.e.” by “recursive”. 
Theorem 3.3 (Church’s theorem). Assume that the language Y contains some relation 
symbol that is not unary.’ Then the set of valid first-order sentences over 6p is not 
recursive. 
Since a set is recursive precisely if it and its complement are r.e., the following is an 
immediate corollary of Corollary 3.2 and Theorem 3.3. 
Corollary 3.4. Assume that the language 2 contains some relation symbol that is not 
unary. Then the set of valid first-order sentences over 2 is r.e. but not co-r.e. 
Interestingly enough, exactly the opposite behavior is true for finite structures. 
Theorem 3.5 (Trakhtenbrot [94]). Assume that the language 2? contains some relation 
symbol that is not unary.2 Then the set offirst-order sentences over $P valid over finite 
structures is co-r.e. but not r.e. 
’ In Church’s original version of this theorem, the language was the language [ +, x } of number theory. 
By techniques of Kalmar [IS, pp. 271-2731, all we need is some relation symbol that is not unary. 
ZAs with Church’s theorem, Trakhtenbrot used a richer language. As before, from Kalmar’s results it 
follows that all that is needed is some relation symbol that is not unary (see e.g. [loo]). 
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The easy (and well-known) part of Theorem 3.5 is that the set of first-order 
sentences valid over finite structures is co-r.e. The reason why this holds is that to find 
whether 0 is not valid, it is possible to consider systematically every finite structure 
.d over the language of 0 to see whether &’ g 0 (it is easy to see that it is decidable to 
determine if .c4 6 0). This makes it possible to list all the sentences that are not valid. 
The hard part of Theorem 3.5, that the set of first-order sentences over finite 
structures is not r.e. (if the language contains some relation symbol that is not unary), 
tells us that there is no completeness theorem for finite structures, since, as we saw, 
completeness implies that the set of valid sentences is r.e. 
If a sentence is valid over all structures, then it is certainly valid when we consider 
only finite structures. (Intuitively, it is easier to be valid over only finite structures than 
over all structures, since there are less possible counterexamples.) However, the 
converse is false. An example of a first-order sentence that is valid over finite 
structures but not over all structures is a first-order sentence that says “if < is a linear 
order, then it has a largest element.” Of course, it also follows from Corollary 3.4 and 
Theorem 3.5 that the set of first-order sentences valid over all structures is not the 
same as the set of first-order sentences valid over finite structures. 
A sentence is said to be jinitely controllable if it is either unsatisfiable or finitely 
satisfiable. A set of sentences is finitely controllable if every member is. Thus, if Y is 
finitely controllable, then every member of 9’ that is satisfiable is finitely satisfiable. 
An important reason why finitely controllable classes are interesting is given by the 
next theorem (which is also well known). 
Theorem 3.6. Let Y be a recursive,finitely controllable set ofjrst-order sentences. The 
decision problem,for satisfiability of members of Y is decidable. 
Proof. Let T be the set of satisfiable members of 9’. Assume that cp~Y. If cp is 
satisfiable, then, by finite controllability, cp is finitely satisfiable. As in the easy part of 
Theorem 3.5, we can “prove” that cp is finitely satisfiable by giving a finite model for cp. 
This shows that T is r.e. If cp is not satisfiable, then we can give a proof of 1 q, by the 
completeness theorem. This shows that T is co-r.e. Since T is both r.e. and co-r.e., it 
follows that T is recursive. 0 
Church’s theorem tells us that the satisfiability problem is undecidable in general 
(since a sentence is satisfiable iff its negation is not valid). However, Theorem 3.6 tells 
us that the satisfiability problem is decidable if we restrict our attention to recursive, 
finitely controllable classes. In fact, finite controllability is one of the main techniques 
used to prove the decidability of the satisfiability problem for special classes of 
sentences. For example, by restricting our attention to prenex normal-form sentences 
with certain quantifier prefixes, we can obtain a finitely controllable class (this point is 
discussed further in Section 6). See [23] for a survey of results in this area (see also 
[SO] and the papers cited therein). 
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Probably the most important corollary of the completeness theorem is the com- 
pactness theorem. 
Theorem 3.7 (Compactness theorem). Let C be a set offirst-order sentences. If every 
finite subset of C is satisfiable, then C is satisfiable. 
Proof. If C is not satisfiable, then C + false, where false is some logically false sentence 
such as p A 1 p. By the completeness theorem, C t- false. Thus, there is a proof of false 
from C is Godel’s proof system. Since every proof is of finite length in Giidel’s proof 
system, only a finite subset C’ G C is used in the proof. So, C’ t-false. By the complete- 
ness theorem again, C’ bfulse. So, C’ is not satisfiable. 0 
The compactness theorem, which is one of the most powerful tools in the arsenal of 
model theory, is not true for finite structures. It is instructive to see an example. For 
each positive integer k, define ak to be a first-order sentence that says “There are at 
least k points.” For example, we can take CT~ to be 
LetZ={ gl, cz, 03, . } . It is easy to see that C is not finitely satisfiable, although every 
finite subset of .Z is finitely satisfiable. 
Two structures ~4 and 2 over the same language are said to be elementarily 
equivalent if, for every first-order sentence r~ in this language, & + rr iif a b c. 
Elementary equivalence is an important model-theoretic notion, since if two struc- 
tures are elementarily equivalent, then they cannot be distinguished by a first-order 
sentence. We close this section with another well-known theorem that is unique to 
finite structures (and that is easy to show). This theorem shows that elementary 
equivalence is uninteresting for finite structures. 
Theorem 3.8. For every jinite Y-structure d, there is a first-order sentence c.~ such 
that an arbitrary Y-structure 33 is isomorphic to .d if 93 + od. 
Thus, each finite structure is characterized up to isomorphism by a first-order 
sentence. Of course, no such theorem is true, in general, about infinite structures; 
consider, for example, nonstandard models of arithmetic. Theorem 3.8 depends on our 
assumption that the language is finite. We note that if the language were allowed to be 
infinite, then it is not hard to show that a variation of Theorem 3.8 holds, where, 
instead of a single first-order sentence g,?, characterizing &, a set C,d of first-order 
sentences characterizes &. So, even if the language were infinite, elementary equiva- 
lence is uninteresting for finite structures. 
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4. Spectra and generalized spectra 
Since this paper is a personal perspective on finite-model theory, let me describe 
how I got interested in finite-model theory. In January of 1968, in a beautifully taught 
introductory logic class that I took as a first-year graduate student in mathematics at 
Berkeley, the professor, Herbert Enderton, mentioned the notion of the spectrum of 
a first-order sentence, which is the set of cardinalities of its finite models. That is, if (T is 
a first-order sentence, and if n is a natural number, then n is in the spectrum of 
(T precisely if there is a structure d that satisfies (T where the cardinality of the universe 
of G? is n. The notion of a spectrum was introduced by Scholz [86]. As an example, if 
cp is a first-order sentence that gives the conjunction of the field axioms (cp says that 
+ and x are associative and commutative, that x distributes over +, etc.), then it is 
well known that the spectrum of cp is the set of powers of primes.3 It is easy to see that 
a spectrum is decidable: to decide if n is in the spectrum of the first-order sentence 0, 
systematically consider every finite structure with universe {O, 1, . . , n - l} over the 
language of (T (there are only a finite number of such structures), and check to see 
whether any of them satisfies 0. If so, then n is in the spectrum of a; if not, then n is not 
in the spectrum of cr. Although every spectrum is a decidable set of positive integers, 
the converse is false. There are several ways to see this. Just as we define the spectrum 
of a first-order sentence, we can similarly define the spectrum of a second-order 
sentence, and see, by an identical argument, that it is decidable. However, Bennett [S] 
showed that there is a set S of positive integers that is the spectrum of a second-order 
sentence but not of a first-order sentence. Such a set S is a decidable set that is not 
a (first-order) spectrum. Another decidable set of positive integers that is not a spec- 
trum can be obtained by forming the diagonal set D such that nEll iff n is not in the 
nth spectrum. Scholz [86] posed the problem of characterizing spectra, and Asser [6] 
posed the following key problem. 
Open problem (Asser problem): Is the class of spectra closed under complement? 
That is, is the complement of every spectrum also a spectrum? 
Because of Enderton’s wonderful class (along with another magical logic class I had 
taken as an undergraduate at Dartmouth under Donald Kreider), I decided in 1969 to 
write my thesis in mathematical logic. My thesis advisor was Robert Vaught. My plan 
was to study spectra and, in particular, Asser’s problem. 
If a(Q1,. ., Qk) is a first-order sentence, 4 then one way to view the spectrum of 
a(Q1 ,..., Qk) is as the set of finite models of 3Q, . . . 3Qk~(Q1, . . ..Qk) (since all of the 
relation symbols in the language have been quantified out, a model is simply a structure 
‘Since, by assumption, there are only relation symbols in the language, take + and x to be ternary 
relations rather than binary functions. 
4 When I write u(Q1,. , Qk) instead of just CT, this is to convey the fact that D is over the language 
iQl,....Qk). 
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with universe of size n over the empty language, and we can identify such 
a structure with the natural number n). Around 1970, I expanded my investigations to 
generalized spectra or, equivalently, C: classes over finite structures, where some, but 
(unlike spectra) not necessarily all, of the relation symbols in the language are 
existentially quantified out. Thus, a C{ sentence is a sentence of the form 
3Q, . . . 3Q,a(Pi, . . . . P,, Q1, . . . . Qk), where a(P1, . . . . P,, Q1, . . . . Qk) is a first-order sen- 
tence and where the Qi’s are relation symbols (these are referred to as the extra 
relation symbols). This C: sentence refers to structures over the language (PI, . , PS}. 
As an example, I now describe a C i sentence that says that a graph is 3-colorable. In 
this sentence, the three colors are represented by Qi, Q2, and Q3. Let P represent the 
graph relation, and let o(P, Q1, Qz, Q3) say “Each point has exactly one color, and no 
two points with the same color are connected by an edge.” Then the Zi sentence 
3Q13Q23Q30(P,Ql,Q2,Q3) says “The graph is 3-colorable.” A class % of (finite) 
structures over some fixed language is said to be C: if it is the class of all (finite) 
structures that obey some fixed Xi sentence. The notion of C: class is the same as 
Tarski’s [93] notion of projective class (PC). In the finite case (where attention is 
restricted to finite structures), a Ci class is called a generalized spectrum. Whereas 
a spectrum is a set of numbers, a generalized spectrum is a set of structures. For 
example, we just showed that the finite 3-colorable graphs form a generalized 
spectrum. 
5. Relation to complexity classes 
Just as a spectrum is decidable, it is easy to see by a very similar argument that the 
set of (encodings of) structures in a generalized spectrum is decidable. As mentioned 
earlier, specrtra are special decidable sets, and a similar comment applies to general- 
ized spectra. I began wracking my brains to try to understand what made these sets 
special. All of a sudden it occurred to me that they were not just decidable, but they 
were very decidable. I had heard rumblings about the exciting new field of complexity 
theory from my roommate John Gill (I, like most mathematics graduate students at 
the time, had never taken a course in computer science), and I decided that complexity 
theory must be able to make precise this notion of very decidable. I immediately began 
studying complexity theory, and I soon realized that, in a precise sense, the class of 
generalized spectra are exactly the class NP (nondeterministic polynomial time), while 
spectra are the class NE (nondeterministic exponential time).’ Thus, not only are 
these classes “very decidable”, but, in fact, they precisely characterize certain complex- 
ity classes. This is quite interesting, since spectra and generalized spectra are defined in 
terms of logic, without using any notion of machine, computation, or time (or, for that 
matter, any notion of polynomial or exponential). We shall see later why generalized 
‘There are various notions of “exponential time” in the literature. In this paper, it means time 2” for 
some constant k, where I is the length of the input. 
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spectra are exponentially simpler (in terms of complexity) than spectra. Intuitively, it 
corresponds to the fact that the size of the input is exponentially bigger for generalized 
spectra than for spectra. For example, it takes around n2 bits to encode a graph on 
n points, whereas it takes only around log, n bits to encode the number n. 
The result that spectra coincide with NE was also obtained by Jones and Selman 
[65]. (I should note that, in my thesis, I erroneously attributed this result, based on 
hearsay reports, to Bennett, although he proved no such result.) The result on spectra 
gives evidence that Asser’s problem (as to whether the complement of every spectrum 
is a spectrum) is hard: it is equivalent to the problem of whether nondeterministic 
exponential time is closed under complement (that is, whether the complement of 
every set recognizable in nondeterministic exponential time is also recognizable in 
nondeterministic exponential time). Questions as to whether nondeterministic time 
classes are closed under complement seem to be very difficult to resolve. (Immerman 
[62] and Szelepcsenyi [90] recently discovered the extremely surprising result that 
nondeterministic space classes are closed under complement.) 
The equivalence between NP and generalized spectra is of interest because of the 
fundamental importance of the class NP in theoretical computer science (see [20, 76, 
681 and, for a comprehensive discussion, [45]). As we shall see, this equivalence may 
allow us to convert a problem in complexity theory into an equivalent problem in 
logic, and vice versa. In particular, results in one field can sometimes be exploited to 
help the other field. 
To obtain a precise statement of the equivalence between NP and generalized 
spectra, we must encode structures by strings over some finite alphabet. For example, 
for simplicity, assume that _Y = {Pi, P2 $, where Pi is a binary relation symbol and P2 
is a ternary relation symbol. Let d be an _fY-structure with universe (0, . . . ,II- 1 ), 
where the interpretation of PI is RI and the interpretation of P, is R2. Define b, to be 
a string of O’s and l’s of length n2, where the (in+j)th member of the sequence b, is 
1 precisely if (i, j)E R 1 (for 0 < i 6 n - 1 and 1 < j < n). Thus, bi encodes R, Similarly, let 
b, encode R2. The encoding enc(.d) of ,& is the string a# bl # b2, where a is the 
binary encoding of n, and # is a new symbol. If 2 is a set of _Y-structures, then let 
Enc(3)={enc(d)I,dE$}. 
Theorem 5.1 (Fagin [31]). Let .9 be a nonempty language, and let 2 be a set of$nite 
.Y-structures that is closed under isomorphism. Then 2 is a generalized spectrum iff 
Enc(Z!) is in NP. 
Note that the assumption of Theorem 5.1 that 4” is nonempty is needed, since 
otherwise we are in the spectrum case, where the corresponding complexity class is 
NE rather than NP. 
Just as there is a simple way to encode each structure by a string of symbols, there is 
also a simple way to encode each string of symbols (which we assume, for simplicity, is 
a string of O’s and l’s) by a structure. Let Y = { U, <}, where U is a unary relation 
symbol and < is a binary relation symbol. We encode the string s=sl . . . s,, where 
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each si is either 0 or 1, by the Y-structure d with universe (0,. . , n - 1 }, where the 
interpretation of < in ~2 is a linear order of the universe, and where, for each i, the ith 
element in the linear order is in the interpretation of U precisely if si = 1. We can then 
obtain a variation of Theorem 5.1, which says that a set of strings is in NP iff the set of 
structures that encode these strings is a generalized spectrum. 
The reason that a generalized spectrum, defined by 3Q, . . . 3QL~(PI,. .., 
P,,Q,,...,Q,),overanonemptylanguage~={P,,...,P,),correspondstoanNPset 
is that to decide if a structure ~2 over 9 satisfies this sentence, a nondeterministic 
polynomial-time Turing machine can simply “guess” the relations corresponding to 
the extra relation symbols Q1, . . . . Qk, and then verify that the structure that is the 
result of expanding .d to include the new relations satisfies a. This verification runs in 
deterministic polynomial time: all of the nondeterminism comes at the beginning, in 
guessing the extra relations. As for the other direction, the generalized spectrum that 
corresponds to an NP set is defined, roughly speaking, by a C: sentence 3 < 3 Tq, 
where cp says that < is a linear order and that T is a nondeterministic Turing machine 
that accepts the encoding of the structure. The purpose of the linear order is to define 
an ordering on k-tuples of members of the universe {0, 1, . , IZ - 11 for some fixed k. 
These k-tuples are used to index both time and tape squares (there are at most nk steps 
and, hence, at most nk tape squares touched). Note that if the language 04y is 
nonempty, the time is polynomial, because, say, in the case of a graph, the length of the 
input is roughly n2 (the number of bits needed to represent a binary relation on 
n points). A similar proof works for the spectrum case, but here nk=2k’ogzn steps is 
exponential time, since the size of the input is roughly log, n in the case of spectra. For 
detailed proofs, see [31]. 
Once we consider generalized spectra rather than just spectra, the natural question 
is the generalization of Asser’s problem. 
Open problem (Generalized Asser problem): Is the class of generalized spectra closed 
under complement? That is, is the complement of every generalized spectrum also 
a generalized spectrum? 
For example, we saw that the class of 3-colorable finite graphs is a generalized 
spectrum. Is the class of finite graphs that are not 3-colorable also a generalized 
spectrum? It follows from the equivalence of generalized spectra with NP that the 
generalized Asser problem is equivalent to a fundamental problem in complexity 
theory. 
Theorem 5.2 (Fagin [31]). The class of generalized spectra is closed under complement 
if NP is closed under complement. 
Probably the most important problem in theoretical computer science is the 
question of whether P = NP. It is a trivial fact that P is closed under complement (by 
reversing accepting and rejecting states). It follows immediately that P = NP implies 
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that NP is closed under complement. Therefore, a negative resolution of the generaliz- 
ed Asser problem (which I believe is the actual situation) implies a negative resolution 
of P =NP. It can be shown by techniques of Savitch [SS] that (1) if P =NP, then 
E=NE (where E represents deterministic exponential time), and (2) if NP is closed 
under complement, then so is NE.6 Now E is closed under complement for the same 
trivial reason that P is closed under complement. So, from (1) we see that P =NP 
implies that NE is closed under complement. Therefore, a negative resolution of the 
Asser question (which I also believe is the actual situation) implies a negative 
resolution of P = NP. Indeed, some people believe that resolving the Asser question is 
much harder than resolving P=NP! 
Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 are “interdisciplinary” theorems, since they relate concepts in 
two distinct fields (logic and complexity theory). Such interdisciplinary theorems have 
(at least) two uses. One is to show the equivalence of important problems in two 
distinct fields. For example, Theorem 5.2 tells us that the generalized Asser problem is 
equivalent to a fundamental problem in complexity theory. Perhaps an even more 
important application of an interdisciplinary theorem is to prove a “pure” theorem (in 
only one field) by taking advantage of results from the other field. Let us consider an 
example, of a theorem of pure logic that would be of interest to a logician who does 
not care about complexity theory, that follows easily from Theorem 5.1. 
Let JV be the class of finite graphs that are not 3-colorable. If the complement of 
every generalized spectrum is a generalized spectrum, then, of course, ,V is a general- 
ized spectrum. The interesting fact is that the converse holds. That is, if there are any 
“counterexamples” at all to the generalized Asser problem, then J’ is such a counter- 
example. 
Theorem 5.3 (Fagin [31]). The complement of every generalized spectrum is a general- 
ized spectrum ifs the class of graphs that are not 3-colorable is a generalized spectrum. 
This result, which is a statement in pure logic that does not mention complexity 
theory at all, follows easily from Theorem 5.1 and from the fact [46] that graph 
3-colorability is an NP-complete problem (as with NP, for information on NP- 
completeness see [20,76,68] and, for a comprehensive discussion, [45]). Any NP- 
complete class of finite graphs (such as the class of finite graphs with a Hamilton cycle) 
can be used instead of the class of 3-colorable graphs in Theorem 5.3. 
As mentioned earlier, we can show that each set of positive integers in NE is the 
spectrum of a first-order sentence cp( <, T), where cp says that < is a linear order and 
6 These results show that we can “go up”. It is an open problem as to whether we can “go down”, that is, 
whether the converse of (1) or (2) holds. In fact, relativized versions of the converses of (1) and (2) are false, 
with a suitable choice of oracle. In the case of (I), this oracle result was claimed by Dekhtyar [22] without 
proof, and proven independently by Wilson [loll (see also [IO]). In the case of (2), this oracle result was 
shown by Hartmanis et al. [57]. 
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that T is a nondeterministic Turing machine that accepts n in time exponential in the 
length of n. If the Turing machine is deterministic, then the sentence cp( <, T) in the 
construction is categorical, which means that, up to an isomorphism, there is at most 
one model of each finite cardinality. Let us define a categorical spectrum to be the 
spectrum of a categorical sentence. From what we have said, we obtain the following 
theorem. 
Theorem 5.4 (Fagin [3 11). Eoery set of positive integers in E is a categorical spectrum. 
It is not clear as to whether the same is true about all spectra. 
Open problem: Is every spectrum a categorical spectrum? 
If P = NP, so that (as noted above) E = NE, we know from Theorem 5.4 that the 
open problem is true, that is, every spectrum is a categorical spectrum. This makes the 
question all the more intriguing, as to whether such a hypothesis is really needed. 
Following Valiant [97], we say that an unambiguous Turing machine is a nondeter- 
ministic Turing machine that has at most one accepting computation for each input. 
Valiant [97] defined the complexity class UP to consist of those languages accepted 
by an unambiguous Turing machine in polynomial time. Similarly, let us define the 
complexity class UE to consist of those languages accepted by an unambiguous 
Turing machine in exponential time. Thus, the complexity class UE lies “between” 
E and NE. Theorem 5.4 can be strengthened to say that every set of positive integers in 
UE is a categorical spectrum. It is not clear as to whether the converse is true. 
Open problem: Are categorical spectra precisely the sets of positive integers in UE? 
The type of characterization of Theorem 5.1 has been obtained for a number of 
complexity classes (see [61] and a survey by Immerman [63]). The most interesting 
complexity class to consider is P (deterministic polynomial time). Ever since the 
publication of [16,24], the class P has often been identified with the class of “feasible” 
problems. An ordered structure is one with a “built-in linear order”, that is, a structure 
over a language that contains a binary relation symbol <, where the interpretation of 
< in the structure is a linear order of the universe. Immerman [60] and Vardi [98] 
have independently obtained a theorem (Theorem 5.5) analogous to Theorem 5.1, 
where the complexity class of interest is P rather than NP.’ However, for Immerman 
and Vardi’s characterization to succeed, it is necessary to restrict our attention to 
ordered structures. Instead of existential second-order sentences, they use sentences in 
jixpoint logic (this is first-order logic, augmented by the least fixpoint operator). An 
example of a fixpoint sentence is 
VxVy~Rxy~(x=y)V3z(PxzARzy)]. (1) 
’ Livchak 1781 obtained a related result; see [Sl] for a discussion 
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We can think of R in (1) as being the transitive closure of P, since intuitively R is the 
least relation such that Rxy holds iff either x=y or there is z such that Pxz and Rzy. 
Therefore, (1) says that the graph represented by P is strongly connected, since it says 
that every pair (x, y) of points is in the transitive closure. The idea of Immerman and 
Vardi’s construction is to define a Turing machine computation by using fixpoints. 
The linear order that is defined existentially in the proof of the “only if” direction of 
Theorem 5.1 cannot be defined by a fixpoint, but needs to be built in. 
Theorem 5.5 (Immerman [60], Vardi [98]). Let 2 be a set ofjnite ordered 5?- 
structures that is closed under isomorphism. Then 9 is dejnable by ajixpoint sentence ifs 
Enc(2) is in P. 
Chandra and Hare1 [ 133 have shown that if we were to drop the word “ordered” in 
Theorem 5.5, then the theorem would be false. In particular, they show that with 
a fixpoint sentence it is not possible to express evenness (“The cardinality of the 
universe is even”). That is, there is no fixpoint sentence (T about, say, graphs, such that 
a graph G satisfies c precisely if G has an even number of nodes. 
Open problem: Find a logic that gives a characterization analogous to Theorem 5.5 
for P, where it is not necessary to restrict oneself to ordered structures. 
Chandra and Hare1 [13] pose as an open problem a technical result closely related 
to this open problem. Namely, they ask if the class of polynomial-time-computable 
queries is r.e. (requirements are that there must be a recursive procedure for going 
from a “query” to a polynomial-time algorithm for evaluating it, and that a query 
must behave the same on isomorphic inputs). Gurevich [52] gives a formal statement 
of what it means for a logic to capture P, and conjectures that there is no such logic. 
Cai et al. [l l] show that a candidate logic (“first-order + least fixpoint + counting”) 
does not capture all polynomial-time properties of graphs. 
We have seen that complexity theory can be helpful to the logician. What about the 
other direction? Can logic be used as a tool to obtain pure complexity-theoretic 
results? By using logic, Ajtai [2] proved the important result (which was obtained 
independently by Furst et al. [41] without using logic) that the parity function cannot 
be realized by a family of bounded-depth, polynomial-size circuits with unbounded 
fan-in. As another example, by thinking in terms of logic, Immerman [62] discovered 
the extremely surprising result that we mentioned earlier that nondeterministic space 
classes are closed under complement (this result, too, was obtained independently 
without using logic [90]). 
6. O-l laws 
In this section, I discuss a topic that is unique to jnite-model theory, namely O-l 
laws. As before, I begin with my personal history. 
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Let S be the spectrum of the first-order sentence 0. Asser’s problem asks whether the 
complement 9 of S is also a spectrum. Since complementation corresponds to taking 
a negation, the first and most naive thing to try in resolving Asser’s problem is to 
consider the negation 1 (T, in the hope that the spectrum of 1 u might be $. Of course, 
this does not work. For example, let cp be the conjunction of the field axioms, so that 
the spectrum of cp is the set of powers of primes. The spectrum of 1 CJJ is not the set of 
numbers that are not powers of primes. Instead, it is easy to see that the spectrum of 
1 CJJ is the set of all positive integers. In fact, the negation 140 is a very uninteresting 
sentence, since it is very easy to violate some field axiom. While playing with such 
examples, I began to wonder whether we have the following general phenomenon: 
(*) “If g is a first-order sentence, then either CJ or 10 is very uninteresting.” 
The way I made precise the notion of “very uninteresting” was by considering 
probabilities. If 40 is the conjunction of the field axioms, then 1 q is “almost surely 
true”, since, intuitively, almost any way one defines the plus and times relations, the 
result will be a nonfield. Define p,(a) to be the fraction of structures with universe 
1091 , . . , , n - 1 } that satisfy a sentence CJ. Equivalently, if we probabilistically generate 
a structure with n nodes, where each possible tuple appears with probability 
4, independently of the other tuples, then ~~(0) is the probability that the structure 
satisfies (T. The sentence CJ is almost surely true if its asymptotic probability is 1, that is, 
if ~~(a) converges to 1 as II goes to infinity. 
If we identify “very uninteresting” with “almost surely true”, then (*) says that every 
first-order sentence or its negation is almost surely true. Remarkably enough, this is 
indeed the case! 
Theorem 6.1 (O-1 law). Let IS be ajrst-order sentence. Either IJ or 1 CT is almost surely 
true. 
This is called a O-l law since it says that p”(o) always converges as n goes to infinity, 
and to either 0 or 1. Moshe Vardi has made an interesting observation about the O-1 
law. There are three possibilities for a sentence: it can be surely true (valid), it can be 
surelyfalse (unsatisfiable), or it can be neither. The third possibility (where a sentence 
is neither valid nor unsatisfiable) is the “common” case. When we consider asymptotic 
probabilities, there are a priori three possibilities: it can be almost surely true (asymp- 
totic probability l), it can be almost surely false (asymptotic probability 0), or it can be 
neither (either because there is no limit, or because the limit exists and is not 0 or 1). 
Again, we might expect the third possibility to be the common case. The O-l law says 
that the third possibility is not only not the common case, but it is, in fact, impossible! 
If a logic (such as first-order logic) has a O-l law, then an immediate corollary is 
that there is no sentence in the logic that can express evenness. That is, there is no 
sentence 0 in the logic about, say, graphs, such that a graph G satisfies CJ precisely if 
G has an even number of nodes. This is because if CJ expressed evenness, then ~,,(a) 
would be 0 if II were odd, and 1 if n were even; so, ,u~(o) would not converge. The fact 
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that no first-order sentence can express evenness can also be proven by other means, 
such as an elimination of quantifiers argument or an Ehrenfeucht-Frai’sse game 
argument. However, there is another logic that I shall discuss shortly where the only 
reason we know that evenness is not expressible is because there is a O-l law. 
We know that existential second-order logic can express evenness (since the equiva- 
lence between generalized spectra and NP tells us that existential second-order logic 
can express any NP property and, in particular, evenness). Therefore, existential 
second-order logic (or any logic that is rich enough to be able to express evenness) 
does not have a O-l law. 
The O-l law was first proved by Glebskii et al. [47] and published in Russian in 
1969; an English translation appeared in 1972. Their proof uses an elimination of 
quantifiers argument. Without knowing about their results, I proved the O-l law in 
1971, and wrote a summary for the American Mathematical Society Notices in 1972 
[29]. Although it appeared in my thesis in 1973, the journal version [35] did not 
appear until 1976, due to refereeing delays. I now describe my proof, which is quite 
different from that of Glebskii et al. 
For ease in description, let us assume for now that the language consists of a single 
binary relation symbol P. Thus, we can view the language as talking about directed 
graphs, where P denotes the edge relation. Everything we say generalizes in a natural 
way to arbitrary languages. Let us define a set T of extension axioms, which say that, 
for each finite set X of points, and each possible way that a point y$X could relate to 
X in terms of atomic formulas, there indeed is such a point y. For example, if 
X contains exactly two points x1 and x2, such an extension axiom would be 
~‘x,~‘x*(x,fxz * 3Y(Yfx,AYZx2AIC/(xl,x*,Y))), 
where $(x1, x2, y) is a conjunction of four atomic formulas: one of Pxi y and 1 Pxr y, 
one of Pyxl and 1 Pyxl, one of Px2 y and 1 Px,y, and one of Pyx, and 1 Pyx,. For 
example, one of the 16 possibilities for $(x1, x2, y) is 
According to Lynch [79], this theory T was discovered in 1958 by Jaskowski 
(unpublished), and it was proven &-categorical (that is, every two countable models 
are isomorphic) by Ehrenfeucht and Ryll-Nardzewski (unpublished) using Cantor’s 
“back-and-forth” argument. Given any two countable models d and B of T, the idea 
of the back-and-forth argument is to build up an isomorphism, step-by-step, between 
&’ and B by using the extension axioms. The first published proof that T is cCO- 
categorical is due to Gaifman [42], who also uses the back-and-forth argument. 
Let B be the unique (up to isomorphism) countable graph that satisfies T. This 
graph was studied by Rado [84], and is sometimes called the Rado graph. It is also 
sometimes called the random countable graph, since, with probability 1, this graph is 
generated by a random process where we start with a countable set of nodes, and 
where each possible edge appears with probability 3, independently of the other edges 
[27,42] (see also [28, pp. 98-991). 
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A useful feature of the random countable graph (that will be exploited later) is that 
every countable graph is embeddable in it. Thus, let us say that a graph &? with 
universe H is a subgraph of the graph 9 if the edges of % are precisely those edges of 
‘9 where both endpoints are in H. We say that graph &? is embeddable in graph $4 if 
.Y? is isomorphic to a subgraph of 9. A graph is universal [66] if every countable graph 
is embeddable in it. The following well-known proposition follows easily by making 
use of the extension axioms. 
Proposition 6.2. The random countable graph is unioersal. 
My proof of the 0-l law now proceeds by proving the following theorem. 
Theorem 6.3 (Fagin [35]). Let .&? be the random countable graph, T the set of extension 
axioms, and CJ a jirst-order sentence. The ,fbllowing are equivalent. 
(1) 8 (= g, that is, 0 is true in 2. 
(2) Tl= O, that is, CJ is a logical consequence qf T. 
(3) g is almost surely true. 
Proof. (l)*(2): Assume that %I= cr, but Tl+ g. So, Tu{l g} is consistent. Now T, 
and, hence, Tu{l CJ), clearly has no finite models; so, Tu {l O} has an infinite 
model. By the Liiwenheim-Skolem theorem [26], Tu(10) has a countable model 
9’. By Ho-categoricity of T, it follows that 8’ is isomorphic to 9. But this is 
impossible, since d I= 0, but %” /= 1~. 
(2)=43): By a simple combinatorial argument [35, p. 521, it follows that every 
member of T is almost surely true. Assume that TI= O. By the compactness theorem, 
for some finite subset T’E T we have T’ I= 0. Since every member of T, and, hence, T’, 
is almost surely true, so is the (finite) conjunction of the members of T’. Since T’ + 0, it 
follows that 0 is almost surely true. 
(3)=>(l): Assume that 3 I# cr. Since .JR is a structure and &Y If: cr, we know that 
.%? /= 1 CJ. By the proof we have already given that (l)+(2)=>(3), where we let 1 CJ play 
the role of CJ, it follows that 1 CT is almost surely true. Therefore, it is certainly not the 
case that CJ is almost surely true. 0 
The equivalence of (1) and (3) is called the transfer property. The transfer property 
says that a first-order sentence about graphs is almost surely true (where we are 
referring to finite graphs) precisely if it is true about the (infinite) graph 2. The 0-l law 
follows immediately from the transfer property. This is because if c is a first-order 
sentence, then either 8 + cr or 9 /= 10; so, by the transfer property, either D or 1 cr is 
almost surely true. An interesting feature of my proof of the 0-l law is that, even 
though the O-l law is a theorem of finite-model theory, where the compactness 
theorem does not apply, the proof uses the compactness theorem! 
As we shall discuss, the transfer property has proven useful in proving O-1 laws for 
other logics (as has the use of the extension axioms). 
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The equivalence of (1) and (2) appears in Gaifman [42]. It follows easily from this 
equivalence that T is complete, that is, for every sentence 0 in the language of T, either 
T + u or T I= 1 C. Since T is also r.e., it follows that the set of logical consequences of 
T, that is, the set of sentences that are almost surely true, is decidable (to decide if c or 
1 c is a consequence of T, just list all proofs involving only hypotheses in T, and look 
for either c or 1 g as a conclusion). This contrasts in an interesting way with 
Trakhtenbrot’s theorem. Although we just showed that the set of first-order sentences 
that are almost surely true is decidable, Trakhtenbrot’s theorem tells us that the set of 
first-order sentences that are surely true (valid over finite structures) is undecidable. 
Grandjean has characterized the complexity of deciding if a first-order sentence is 
almost surely true. 
Theorem 6.4 (Grandjean [49]). The problem of deciding if a first-order sentence is 
almost surely true is PSPACE-complete. 
The O-l law has been extended to logics richer than first order. Blass et al. [9] and 
Talanov and Knyazev [92] have shown that the O-l law holds for fixpoint logic. 
(Note that this is consistent with Chandra and Harel’s result [13] mentioned earlier 
-that in fixpoint logic, it is not possible to express evenness.) Kolaitis and Vardi [72] 
have shown that the O-l law holds for iterative logic (which subsumes fixpoint logic), 
for the infinitary logic Lzw (which subsumes iterative logic), where disjunctions and 
conjunctions may be infinitely long, but where there are only a finite number of 
distinct variables in a sentence [75], and for certain interesting fragments of existential 
second-order logic [72,73]. Let us now focus on this last result, about fragments of 
existential second-order logic. 
A prejix class is a class of first-order sentences (in prenex normal form) defined by 
a quantifier prefix. Several prefix classes are of special interest: 
l The BernaysPSchiinfinkel class, where the quantifier structure is 3 *V * (that is, the 
existential quantifiers all precede the universal quantifiers). 
l The Ackerman class, where the quantifier structure is 3 *V3 * (that is, there is exactly 
one universal quantifier). 
l The Giidel class, where the quantifier structure is g*VV’3* (that is, there are exactly 
two universal quantifiers, and they are adjacent). 
A prefix class is called solvable if the decision problem for satisfiability of sentences 
in the class is decidable. The only solvable prefix classes are the BernayssSchdnfinkel 
class and the Ackerman class [23, 77, 48].8 These classes were proven solvable by 
showing that they are finitely controllable (see Theorem 3.6). Of course, they are the 
only finitely controllable prefix classes, since finite controllability implies solvability. 
The O-l law does not hold for existential second-order logic (since it is possible to 
express evenness in this logic, that is, with a C: sentence). In fact, Kaufmann and 
’ Our attention is restricted to sentences with equality. Otherwise, there is an additional solvable prefix 
class, namely the GGdel class without equality. 
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Shelah [70] showed that the O-l law fails for monadic second-order logic, and 
Kaufmann [69] extended this to the existential monadic second-order case. Kolaitis 
and Vardi systematically considered whether or not the O-l law holds for existential 
second-order sentences 3 Q I . . . 3Qko, where we restrict the prefix class for the first- 
order part 0. They proved that the O-l law holds when the first-order part is in either 
the Bernays-Schonfinkel class [72] or the Ackerman class [73J9 and that it fails in 
certain other cases. They made the bold conjecture that the O-1 law holds for the 
fragment of existential second-order logic where the first-order part must be in a given 
prefix class precisely when the prefix class is solvable. The final step in proving that 
their conjecture is indeed correct was given by Pacholski and Szwast [S3], who 
showed that the O-l law fails for the fragment where the first-order part is in the 
Giidel class. 
Recently, Kolaitis and Vardi [74] discovered at least a partial explanation for this 
surprising correspondence. The connection they found is between the tools used for 
proving the O-l law on the one hand, and the tools used for proving the solvability of 
the prefix class on the other. In both of the cases where there is a O-l law (where the 
prefix class is the Bernays-Schonfinkel class or the Ackerman class), Kolaitis and 
Vardi proved the O-l law by proving (the analogue of) the transfer property. Further, 
as noted above, the Bernays-Schbnfinkel class and the Ackerman class are the only 
finitely controllable prefix classes, and finite controllability is the tool used classically 
to prove solvability (via Theorem 3.6). Kolaitis and Vardi have found a simple 
argument, which I shall give shortly, that the transfer property implies finite controlla- 
bility of the prefix class. One way to view this is that each prefix class %? is either bad or 
very good. Being bad means that (a) ?Z is not solvable, and (b) the O-l law fails for the 
fragment where the first-order part is in q. Being very good means that the fragment 
where the first-order part is in +Z satisfies the transfer property. The transfer property 
simultaneously implies (a) the O-l law for the fragment (this is immediate) and (b) 
solvability of %? (since the transfer property implies finite controllability of %, which 
implies solvability of %Y). 
I now give Kolaitis and Vardi’s argument that the transfer property implies finite 
controllability of the prefix class. Assume that we are dealing with sentences 
3Q,. . . 3Qka about graphs, where CJ is in a given prefix class, and assume that CJ is 
satisfiable. We wish to show that CJ is finitely satisfiable. Since CJ is satisfiable, it follows 
by the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem that c has a countable model, and, so, 3Qi.. .3Q,o 
has a countable model d. By Proposition 6.2, it follows that &’ is embeddable in the 
random countable graph. Therefore, the relativized sentence 3A 3Qi . . . 3QkaA holds 
for the random countable graph, where A is a new unary relation symbol (intuitively, 
all first-order quantifiers are restricted to ranging through A). Since &’ is in the same 
prefix class as CJ, it follows by the transfer property that 3A3Q1 ...3QkgA is almost 
‘The Ackerman case is the one alluded to earlier where we know that evenness is not expressible because 
of the O-l law, but where it is not clear how to show that evenness is not expressible without using the O-1 
law. 
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surely true and, in particular, has a finite model. It follows easily that (T has a finite 
model. 
Considering logics other than first-order is just one direction in which the O-l law 
has been extended. I will now mention some other directions, all of which deal with 
first-order logic. In [35] I showed that the O-l law holds also when we consider 
“unlabeled” rather than “labeled” structures (that is, where two structures are con- 
sidered different precisely when they are nonisomorphic). Compton [17] has con- 
sidered restricted classes of structures, and relates the existence of a O-l law with 
convergence properties of the exponential generating series for the class. Shelah and 
Spencer [88] have considered random graphs where the edge probability, instead of 
being a constant (such as f), is instead a function p(n) of the number IZ of nodes. They 
show the fascinating result that if p(n) = n-‘, where 0 < CI < 1, then there is a O-l law iff 
CI is irrational. This is related to the fact that p(n)=n -OL is a threshold function for the 
presence of some graph precisely if M is rational. For a discussion of threshold 
functions, see [28]. For a comprehensive survey on O-l laws, see [lS]. 
If constant or function symbols were allowed into the language, then there would 
not be a O-1 law. For example, if c is a constant symbol and U a unary relation 
symbol, then UC has probability 4. Similarly, if f is a unary function symbol, then 
Vx(f(x)#x) has asymptotic probability l/e [35]. Lynch [SO] has shown that if the 
language contains only unary function symbols, then there is an asymptotic probabil- 
ity, even though, as we just saw, it need not be 0 or 1. Compton et al. [ 193 have shown 
that if the language consists of a single binary function symbol, then there is not 
necessarily an asymptotic probability. 
Although there are now a number of cases where O-l laws are known to hold, and 
a number of cases where 0-l laws are known not to hold, we do not really understand 
the deep reasons underlying this phenomenon. This leads to a very interesting 
(although necessarily murky) question, posed by Irv Traiger. 
Question: What really causes there to be a O-l law? 
7. Descriptive complexity 
The descriptive complexity of a class is, informally, the complexity of describing the 
class in some logical formalism. For example, we might consider whether a class is 
first-order-definable, and, if so, we might want to ask, say, how many quantifiers are 
required. Hartmanis suggested the name “descriptive complexity” to Immerman, who 
used it in [63]. This section will focus on descriptive complexity, where we are 
particularly interested in second-order quantifiers. 
By definition, every generalized spectrum is defined by an existential second-order 
sentence &IQ, . ..3Q.a(P1, . . . . P,,Q1, . . . . Q,J, where o(P,, . . . . P,,Q,, . . . . Qk) is first- 
order. In my struggles with the Asser problem and the generalized Asser problem, 
I began to wonder whether the problems would be easier if I were to restrict the extra 
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relation symbols Q1, . . , Qk. I found that one case, indeed, is much more tractable than 
the general case. This tractable case occurs when the extra relation symbols are all 
restricted to being unary. Such generalized spectra are called monadic. It is not 
surprising that the monadic case should be simpler, since results like Church’s 
theorem and Trakhtenbrot’s theorem depend on the language containing some 
relation symbol that is not unary. Monadic generalized spectra are referred to as 
monadic NP in [37]. 
We saw that the class of finite 3-colorable graphs is a monadic generalized 
spectrum. From this and Theorem 5.3, we know that the generalized Asser question is 
equivalent to the problem of whether there is a monadic generalized spectrum whose 
complement is not a generalized spectrum. I was able to show that there is a monadic 
generalized spectrum whose complement is not a monadic generalized spectrum. To 
show that, I first proved the next theorem, which gives us a natural example of 
a generalized spectrum that is not monadic. 
Theorem 7.1 (Fagin [32]). The class qf jinite connected graphs is not a monadic 
generalized spectrum. 
This proof of Theorem 7.1 appears in [32]. It involves an Ehrenfeucht-Frai’sse 
game argument and a characterization of (monadic) generalized spectra by Ehren- 
feucht&Frai’sse games. Recently, Stockmeyer, Vardi and I obtained a much simpler 
proof [37]. 
Let 1 be the class of finite connected graphs. It is not hard to see [32, p. 961 that 2 is 
a generalized spectrum with a single extra binary relation symbol (we already knew 
that 2 is a generalized spectrum by Theorem 5.1, since Enc(%) is in P and, hence, in 
NP). Although 2 is a generalized spectrum, Theorem 7.1 tells us that 9 is not 
a monadic generalized spectrum. The complement of 1 (the class of finite graphs that 
are not connected) is a monadic generalized spectrum, via 
3A(3xAxA3xlAxAvxv~(Pxy~(Ax~Ay))). (2) 
Thus, we can indeed answer a weak version of the generalized Asser problem. 
Theorem 7.2 (Fagin [32]). The class of monadic generalized spectra is not closed 
under complement. 
Some comments are in order about Theorem 7.1. In the nonfinite case, the analogue 
of Theorem 7.1 can be proven by a standard compactness argument. In fact, this same 
argument shows that not only is the class of connected graphs not definable by 
a monadic C: sentence, it is not definable by any C: sentence whatsover. The argument 
is as follows. Assume that connectedness were definable by the Xi sentence 
3Q, . . . 3Qka, where o is first-order. Let s and t be new constant symbols,” and let yk 
be a first-order sentence that says “There is no path between s and t of length at most 
lo Here we are allowing constant symbols into the language. 
Finite-model theory -a personal perspectice 23 
k.” Let C be the set {o, yi, y2 y3, . . . }. Clearly, every finite subset of C is satisfiable. By 
the compactness theorem, C is satisfiable. But this is impossible, since this gives us 
a graph that is connected, but where there is no path from s to t. 
If all we care about is showing that connectedness is not first-order-definable (as 
opposed to C: -definable) in the finite case, then the result is much easier (although not 
as easy as the nonfinite case, where, as we just saw, there is an easy compactness 
argument). This result can be shown using an argument similar to one Frai’sse [40] 
used to show that if T is the set of true first-order sentences in the language of 
successor about the successor relation on the natural numbers, then T is not equiva- 
lent to a single first-order sentence. This result can also be shown with an Ehren- 
feucht-Fraisse game argument similar to (but easier than) the argument I used to 
prove Theorem 7.1. It is interesting to note that this result (i.e., the finite first-order 
case) keeps getting rediscovered, for example, by Aho and Ullman [l] (see survey in 
C441). 
Theorem 7.1 holds whether we consider directed or undirected graphs. There are 
times, however, when the directed and undirected cases are different. Ifs and t denote 
distinguished points in a directed (undirected) graph, then a graph is (s, t)-connected if 
there is a directed (undirected) path from s to t. In 1986, Paris Kanellakis pointed out 
to me that the class of (s, t)-connected undirected graphs is a monadic generalized 
spectrum. l1 I was surprised, since (s, t)-connectivity is very close in spirit to connect- 
ivity, which by Theorem 7.1 is not a monadic generalized spectrum (in fact, it is easy to 
fool oneself into believing that the proof of Theorem 7.1 can be modified so that we 
can replace “connected” by “(s, t)-connected”). To see that the class of (s, t)-connected 
undirected graphs is a monadic generalized spectrum, let $ be a first-order sentence 
that says “The set A contains both s and t; every member of A except for s and t has an 
edge to precisely two members of A; and s and t each have an edge to exactly one 
member of A.“12 I will now show that the C: sentence 3A$ says that the graph is (s, t)- 
connected. For, if the graph is (s,t)-connected, and if A is taken to consist of those 
vertices on a shortest path from s to t, then Ic/ holds. Conversely, if $ holds, then there 
is a path starting at s that passes through only vertices in A. The path must end 
somewhere, since the graph is finite; however, the only place it can end is at t. So, the 
graph is (s, t)-connected. 
Kanellakis asked whether the same is true about directed graphs. As Ajtai and 
I showed recently, the answer is “No”. 
Theorem 7.3 (Ajtai and Fagin [3]). The class of (s, t)-connectedjinite directed graphs 
is not a monadic generalized spectrum. 
I’ Again we are allowing the constant symbols s and t into the language. 
I* I am here assuming that the language consists of a binary relation P where it is “built-in” that 
represents a set of unordered pairs. Without this assumption, we can simply add a clause of (I/ that says that 
the graph is undirected, namely VxVy( Pxy o Pyx). 
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Let 9 be a generalized spectrum defined by 3Q, . . . 3Qko(P1, . . . . Ps,QI, . . . . Qk). 
Thus, the extra relation symbols are Q1, . . . . Qk, and 9 is a class of structures over 
9 = {P, , . , P, 1. Define Pm(Y) to consist of all such generalized spectra, where the 
arity of each of the extra relation symbols is at most m. So, there is a hierarchy 
(The inclusion F,,,(Y) G F, + 1 (2) holds because of well-known techniques of simula- 
ting m-ary relations by (m+ 1)-ary relations.) If _.$?=a, (so that we are considering 
spectra), then it is well known that, by an elimination of quantifiers argument, it 
follows that FI (8) contains only finite and cofinite sets. However, it is easy to see that 
the set of even positive integers is a member of FZ(8). Hence, we have the strict 
inclusion Fl(0)c~2(0). Similarly, for arbitrary languages 9, the class of _Y’-struc- 
tures where the cardinality of the universe is even is in FZ(_5Y) but not gr(9). 
(Theorem 7.1 gives us another generalized spectrum in PZ(._Y) but not FI(6p) when 
9 consists of a single binary relation symbol.) 
Open problem: Is the hierarchy ~~(Y)E~~(P’)G~~(Y)G ..’ strict for every 
language 5?? For some language Dy? 
One way to try to prove that the hierarchy is strict is to show that the hierarchy 
interleaves with a complexity hierarchy that is known to be strict. Thus, one might 
hope to exploit Cook’s result [21] that nondeterministic time complexity na is strictly 
more powerful than nondeterministic time complexity np, for CY > p > 1. The problem is 
that there is no k for which it is clear that every member of gZ(P’) can be recognized 
nondeterministically in time nk. For example, consider a formula 3Qq, where Q is 
a binary relation symbol, and where cp is first-order and has a quantifier prefix of 17 
first-order quantifiers. Let .01 be a structure with universe of size n. What is the time to 
decide nondeterministically whether .F4 + 3Qq? Under the naive approach, we would 
first guess the binary relation corresponding to Q, and then cycle through all n17 
possibilities for the 17 variables quantified by the first-order quantifiers. Although the 
first step (guessing the binary relation) takes time only n2, the next step takes time II “. 
Although I was not able to show that the hierarchy is strict, I was able to show that 
if the hierarchy collapses at some point, then it collapses from that point on. 
Theorem 7.4 (Fagin [33]). Assume that Fp(Li?)=.Fp+,(S?). Then Fq(Y)=Fq(L?)for 
each q>p. 
That is, either the hierarchy is strict, so that 
9r(P)cP-~(Y)c9~(Y)~ “., 
or else there is p such that 
Pr(Y)c ‘.f c~~~(~)=~~+1(~)=~~+2(~)= “. 
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Ajtai has proven the following result. 
Theorem 7.5 (Ajtai [2]). If_Y contains an m-ary relation symbol P, then the class of 
Z-structures where the P relation has an even number of tuples is not in F,,- I(_Y). 
However, this class (where the P relation has an even number of tuples) is clearly 
a generalized spectrum (in fact, Ajtai [2] shows that if ma2, then this class is in 
F,,,(P), although we do not need this fact). This gives the following corollary. 
Corollary 7.6. If 2’ contains an m-ary relation symbol, then FI(~)c9~(6p)c 
..’ CF~_~(6p)CF~(~). 
Proof. Find q>m so large that the class of Y-structures where the P relation has an 
even number of tuples is in Fq(P’) (as noted earlier, we could actually take q=m if 
m32). By Theorem 7.5, we know that ~,,,-l(-r;P)#~~(P’). If Pi-l(Z’)=Pi(L??) for 
some i<m, then, by Theorem 7.4, we would have F,,_ 1(LP) = Fq(_Y), a contra- 
diction. 0 
Two choices of the language ~5’ are of special interest: when 6p is empty (which 
corresponds to spectra), and when _P consists of a single binary relation symbol 
P (which corresponds to generalized spectra about graphs). In these cases, Corollary 
7.6 gives us no information beyond the simple facts, which we noted earlier, that 
@-1(0)cY~(8) and Yl({P))cPZ({P>). F or all we know, every spectrum is in YZ(@), 
and every generalized spectrum about graphs is in YZ ({ P}). That is, it seems possible 
that the only extra relation symbols that are required are binary. In fact, it is even 
conceivable that only one extra binary relation symbol suffices. The following open 
problems are from [33]. 
Open problem: Is there any spectrum that is not the spectrum of a sentence over the 
language of a single binary relation symbol? That is, does a single binary relation 
symbol suffice? 
Open problem: Is there any generalized spectrum about graphs that cannot be 
defined by 3Qq, where Q is a binary relation symbol and cp is first-order? That is, does 
a single extra binary relation symbol suffice? 
Some further results in descriptive complexity on finite models have been proven. 
For example, Immerman has obtained results on the number of quantifiers [SS] and 
the number of variables [59] needed to define certain classes. Turin [95] has obtained 
various descriptive complexity results, including the result that the class of finite 
graphs with a Hamilton cycle cannot be defined by a monadic second-order sentence 
(where we allow arbitrary quantification over sets). However, descriptive complexity 
has not “caught on” to the same extent as the work on relationships with complexity 
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classes (Section 5) and on O-l laws (Section 6). I hope that there will be more work in 
this area. 
8. Conclusions 
Finite-model theory is that branch of model theory that focuses on$nite structures. 
Moshe Vardi has suggested to me a classification of finite-model theory into three 
lines of research. 
The first line of research he calls rzegatiue; here we consider theorems of model 
theory that fail for finite-model theory. Some such results are easy to find (such as the 
failure of the compactness theorem). Other such results are a little more difficult to 
prove, but still have simple, elegant proofs. For example, consider the substructure 
preservation theorem [14], which says that if a first-order sentence 0 has the property 
that every substructure of a model of c is a model of Q, then 0 is equivalent to 
a universal sentence. This theorem fails for finite structures [91] (see also [Sl]). Still 
other such results are much harder to prove. A nice example is Ajtai and Gurevich’s 
result [4] that Lyndon’s theorem (which says that monotone and positive classes 
coincide) fails for finite structures. 
The second line of research could be called preservative; here we consider theorems 
of model theory that continue to hold for finite-model theory. Again, some such 
results are easy (such as theorems that tells us that EhrenfeuchttFrai’sse games are 
necessary and sufficient for resolving expressibility in a given logic). Kolaitis recently 
showed me another easy (but slightly surprising) example. Although Craig’s theorem 
and Beth’s theorem fail for finite structures, Kolaitis observed that the closely related 
Robinson consistency theorem holds (the proof follows easily from Theorem 3.8). l3 
Some results in the preservative line of research are harder to prove. One example is 
Theorem 7.1, which says that the class of finite connected graphs is not a monadic 
generalized spectrum. (As we noted, the same result holds in the nonfinite case, by 
a simple compactness argument.) Ajtai and Gurevich [S] showed that a Datalog 
query is first-order iff it is bounded (for definitions of these terms, see [43]). In the 
nonfinite case, this result follows by a straightforward compactness argument; how- 
ever, the proof is much more difficult in the finite case. 
Other possible results in the preservative line of research are extremely difficult, and 
their resolution would be a major breakthrough. Probably the best example is given 
by the generalized Asser problem, which is equivalent by Theorem 5.2 to the question 
of whether NP is closed under complement. However, the corresponding question in 
the nonfinite case, as to whether every Xi class is closed under complement, is well 
known to have a negative answer. As a counterexample, the class of (not necessarily 
‘jThis contrasts in an interesting way with results in “abstract model theory” (cf. 17, 82]), where 
Robinson consistency is a very strong property and, in fact, is equivalent to the combination of compactness 
and Craig interpolation. 
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finite) graphs that are not connected is C: , via (2) of Section 7. However, I already 
noted that the complement (the class 9 of connected graphs) is not Xi. Actually, since 
9 is not first-order, the fact that 9 is not C: is an instance of a general phenomenon. 
Specifically, in the nonfinite case it follows from the Craig interpolation theorem that 
if a class and its complement are both C: , then the class is first-order definable. 
A logic, such as first-order logic, that obeys this property is called d-closed; cf. [7]. Of 
course, first-order logic is not d-closed if we restrict our attention to finite structures: 
for example, evenness is C: , as is the complement (“oddness”), but, as we have noted, 
evenness is not first-order-definable. 
The final line of research Vardi calls positive; here we consider results that are 
unique to finite-model theory. Good examples are the result of Section 5 (the 
relationship to complexity classes) and of Section 6 (on 0- 1 laws). Another example is 
Immerman’s result [60] that, for finite structures, fixpoint logic is closed under 
complement, and the related result by Gurevich and Shelah [54] that, for finite 
structures, different natural fixed-point logics all have the same expressive power. 
A recent nice example was obtained by Kolaitis [71]. As noted earlier, Beth’s theorem 
(which says that implicit definability is equivalent to explicit definability) fails for finite 
structures. Rather than stopping there, Kolaitis explores the expressive power of 
implicit definability on finite structures, and obtains very interesting results. 
Finite-model theory is a fascinating area, on the borderline of logic, computer 
science, and combinatorics. I hope and believe that it will flourish even more in the 
future. 
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